Political Economy Analysis of The Rentier State: *The Nigerian Experience*

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Abstract
The paper examines the political economy of rentier states with specific emphasis on social, political and economic development of the Nigerian state. The question posed was whether there exists a correlation between natural resources endowment and economic development. The Marxist alienation theory was adopted as a framework of analysis. Using textual analysis, it was discovered that rent-seeking is not completely bad for economic growth, however, most rents are ultimately dissipated, and produces divided societies and non-inclusive politics. It was concluded that Nigeria is a typical example of a rent-seeking state since over eighty percent of its wealth or earnings are derived from a natural resource-oil; and the leadership in Nigeria has exhibited remarkable penchant for cornering and misappropriating the wealth, hence the deplorable level of development in the country in-spite of her huge revenues from oil. The study generally recommends major policy re-forms that will strengthen regulatory institutions to act as checks and balances that will ensure the effective use of these resources.

Key words: Political economy, rent seeking, economic development, natural resources, maxist alienation theory.

Introduction
A comprehensive examination of the problems, occurrences, and policies in every society is made possible by the study of political economy as both a concept and a discipline. It specifically addresses the legal framework guiding how society changes through time. The physical and social worlds each have two fundamental rules that regulate how society develops. These rules are not just a random aggregation of separate, unrelated facts. The main goal of science (whether natural or social) is to find, explain, and interpret these laws because social laws are interrelated and interdependent just like natural laws are (Tade, 1986).

The laws regulating both the physical and social worlds must be universal. This is because both are objective in nature; as a result, they exist and function whether or not we are aware of them and whether or not we want them to. These laws cannot be amended, altered, repealed, or replaced by new laws. People can only find them. The fact that these rules are objective does not imply that people are helpless in the face of them; rather, they can become familiar with them and employ them for the good of society (Tade, 1986).

© **Benue Journal of Social Sciences (BJSS) Vol. 9 No. 1, 2023, Pp.122-131**
An Annual Publication of The Faculty of Social Sciences, Benue State University, Makurdi.

Political economy is a helpful tool for scientific research and may be considered from two perspectives: first, as a comprehensive scientific mode of study, and second, as the setting in which socioeconomic activities occur (Tade, 1986). More crucially, political economy can be utilized as a tool for comprehending the social dynamics that result in material production and the socio-economic relationships that underpin it.

Political economy was simply referred to as economics in the 19th century. In other words, throughout the time of the classical economists, the terms "economics" and "political economy" were interchangeable. Therefore, it implies that political economics went through a number of stages before reaching the current level of discourse. A Rentier State on the other hand refers to a country that derives all or a huge of the proportion of its national revenues from the rents paid by foreign individuals, groups, organizations or other governments. In the economic sense a rentier state is a product of a rentier economy; a system where economic actors whether private or public pay financial returns to the state they operate in because of the huge market power such businesses and other economic transactions have been able to develop. It is these rents that help the government to provide basic services and also ensure security. Most rentier states have not developed the needed technology to adequately exploit their natural resources and literally throw open their domestic economy to do same. These investors which include other foreign governments usually want to evade monetary obligations to the state where they are operating but the state utilizes this presence to impose financial obligations in the form of rents for doing economic activity. States which create bulk of their economic capital from this source are dubbed rentier states.

The primary goals of political economy as a science are the identification, investigation, and interpretation of the economic rules governing social development. The rentier capitalist ideology aids states with a basic model on how to apply to its political economy, a source for creating financial capital for development, (Mahdavy 1970). With a focus on the creation of material prosperity, political economics examines the foundations on which society develops. Only the economic relationships between the participants in the production process are examined in this study of production. According to Lenin (1973), political economy is concerned more with the social interactions of the persons who are engaged in production than it is with the technical components of production. Accordingly, political economy can be summed up as the discipline that investigates the rules controlling the creation, transfer, exchange, and use of material wealth in human society at different phases of development (Tade, 1986). It is in these perspectives that our specific interpretation of the rentier ie 'rent seeking' state is also understood.

Historical Development of Rent-Seeking

It is essential to begin with a comprehension of the concept of rent, which is where the phrase "rent-seeking" comes from. Generally speaking, rent is the sum of money that is routinely paid in exchange for the use of a home, building, parcel of land, or other sort of property. In other words, when a home is regularly rented, the owner receives a fixed payment. (https://www.collinsdictionary.com>...).

The issue of rents has always been present in human behavior. Instead of putting talents and resources toward useful work, individuals have long struggled and competed for goods. Success in rent-seeking led to the creation of the great empires and their conquest campaigns. Defense of the rents that the empires offered required resources as well. The inefficient use of resources to compete rather than produce wealth also happened within societies in an effort to topple incumbent rulers and to win the favor of rulers who distributed rewards and frequently determined life and death; sacrifices made by early people to their deities were examples of rent-seeking; valuable possessions were given up with the intention of trying to influence assignment or other rewards. Rent-seeking occurs in democratic institutions today as well as in autocracies that resemble the conditions of the earlier rent-dispersing political leadership. Rent-seeking incentives exist whenever decisions made by others have an impact on an individual's life or, more generally, whenever resources can be used to influence distributional outcomes (Congletion and Konrad, 2008).

The phrase "rent-seeking" has been a well-established expression in socioeconomic and political literature for almost three decades. Tollison (1982) provides a brief but excellent overview of rent-seeking. With many commonly used terms like "corruption," "lobbying," good governance, and bound rationality, the terminology finally entered the lexicon of donors and policymakers at the operational political stage in the 1990s. However, rent-seeking and the broad range of activities it encompasses do not have a single, agreed-upon definition. The term might be used in a variety of ways, depending on the author, context, and audience. Additionally, there are other terms and ideas used to describe ineffective actions, such as corruption or soft budget restrictions, which are either used as synonyms, subsets, or similar but distinct aspects of rent-seeking.

Though Tulluck (1974, p.147) noted that the relevant theory had already been developed by himself in 1967, in his original article "The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft" (Tulluck, 1967), he specifies many important issues rent-seeking theory deals with. The term "rent-seeking" was introduced in the field of political economy by Anne Krucger in her famous paper "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society" in 1974. He added that the word "rent-seeking" does not adequately capture the essence of rentierism. It should actually be contrasted with the more prevalent kind of individual maximization behavior, profit-seeking. But in both situations, rents are sought for and wasted—that is, too much time is spent engaging in unhealthy activities and physical gratification.

Strategies and Forms of Rent-seeking

Circle of Rent Seeking

It is crucial to note that rent seeking affects a variety of levels of governance, from military or civilian regimes at the top through the civil service. Similar to this, there are many different methods and forms of rent-seeking, from giving subsidies to businesses like oil drilling and importation rather than giving them to people who face particular hardship due to hardship, disabilities, or agriculture to help farmers diversify their economies, to extorting rent through contracts, including tax exemptions. But in most developing nations, corruption, bribery, and lobbing are the most common methods of rent-seeking.



Source: Mehmood (2014)

Tanzi (1998) defined corruption as the abuse of governmental authority for personal gain. This abuse of public authority may be for the benefit of the tribe, friends, family, and other groups in addition to personal gain. According to Nye, "it is a behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, family, private, clique) monetary or status gains." This encompassed inappropriate behavior such as resource misappropriation and diversion, as well as the unlawful exploitation of public resources for personal gain (Nye, 1907).

Accepting something with the goal to influence the recipient in a way that benefits the party offering the bribe is the main definition of bribery (www.businesdictionary.com>definition). To put it another way, bribery is the offer or promise of financial gain in exchange for favors at the discretion of a public person. It is a corrupt act that transgresses the public sector's obligation to serve the general public. For example, the MTN network have made illegal deductions, outrageous charges on calls and data subscriptions, yet they have never appeared before the National Assembly to account for their service delivery and continue to evade sanctions by the Nigerian government, (8/5/2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/0/summons-ncc-mtn-glo-others-). Lobbying at this point refers to the act and process of attempting to influence decisions made by officials of government, these officials are frequently legislators or members of the government's regulatory agencies.

Dimensions on Rent-seeking in Nigeria

Diverging opinions exist in Nigeria regarding rent-seeking. While some believe that colonialism's role in our entry into the global capitalist system is the primary cause of unfair trade in general and rent-seeking in particular, others believe that rent-seeking in Nigeria is a result of the nature and character of the Nigerian state as well as the leadership's lack of commitment to promoting productivity. We will now look more closely at this opposing viewpoint. It's also very crucial to understand that the oil industry will be the main focus of our study of rent-seeking in Nigeria. This is due to the fact that oil accounts for the majority of the government's income and 90% of Nigeria's exports (Herbst and Olukoship, 1994; p. 453).

Tullock (1967) asserts that a detailed example may be the most effective way to clarify the notion. A highly efficient corporation will generate \$5000 in rent for every car it makes if the cost per unit is \$9000 and the automobiles can be sold for \$14,000 on the open market. This rent is of a transient character in an environment that is genuinely competitive. Other businesses may develop efficiency over time and offer comparable or superior autos at a reduced price. If the original car is still available on the market, competition and technological advancement may finally drive down the price, and the rent will probably decrease or even vanish. With the creation of new cars, new rentals appear, however these are also very ephemeral. In general, the pursuit of transitory rents increases the welfare of societies as car prices fall and/or automobile quality rises, putting population-related externalities associated with the production and use of cars aside. This is the tale of how competition improves welfare that is typically taught in economics textbooks, especially for nations like Nigeria that lack productivity.

Alternately, company officials may attempt to persuade the government to out rightly ban the import of any cars as a way to protect jobs in the domestic auto sector at an early stage. They may even use bribery or lobbying to induce legislators to make the firm the only automobile manufacturer in the nation in order to obtain economies of scale. Rent-seeking here by government officials seeks financial gain at the expense of the general public while their own objectives to promote efficiency often fail. In such a market monopoly, it would not be surprising if the government for instance decides to provide a subpar car for \$6,000 and still sell it to the citizens for \$16,000. The difference between \$16,000 and \$6000 is the fictitious rent the manufacturer receives as a result of the protection, assuming that the manufacturer can only charge \$6,000 for the low-quality car in a non-protected market setting. Due to the lack of options to purchase better or more affordable cars that are currently available outside of the protected market, consumers are forced to pay this price. Government involvement has produced the fictitious \$10,000 rent for the sole purpose of rent-seeking.

Rent-seekers steal from the public at the expense of their own interests and those of the ruling class. In order to block competition from other satellite cable network providers and so establish monopoly, Multichoice, the owners of the Digital Satellite Television brand, (DSTV) has consistently lobbied lawmakers, the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), and other high-ranking government officials. Eventually, official sanctions are not effected even when service prices indiscriminately increase. It further impedes efforts to develop local technology. Thus, inadequate institutional arrangements and inadequate policies are common in developing countries, where people steal from the government and seize substantial portions of the country's income in clearly unproductive ways. They may obtain the same benefits through an unlawful arrangement with dishonest government officials, or obtain the tax exemption they have been formally advocating for but an elaboration of corruption typifies the latter perspective. Whether rents are collected lawfully or illegally has no bearing on the economy, as unscrupulous rent-seeking would stifle progress in both scenarios, (Tullock, 1989).

Capitalists Integration View

The debate over whether national resource endowment is detrimental to development appears to have reached a point of consensus among academics in the development literature. Since then, a plethora of political theories have been put forth in an effort to explain the occurrence. Rentierism, or the rentier effect, is the most popular explanation. In essence, rentierism has gained acceptance as a general theory for illuminating how natural resources hinder the growth of endowed nations. It has come to be regarded as conventional wisdom in relation to Nigeria for illuminating the paradox between her vast resource endowment and her severe development issues.

The main claim of rentierism is that governments become less accountable to the societies they rule when they receive the majority of their funding from external sources, such as resource rents or foreign aid (Ross, 2001, pp. 8–9). As a result, they are freed from the need to increase and use domestic taxes. As a result, the ruling class can spend the rents for their own privileges, to strengthen their own position of power and access to these rents, and for short-sighted public spending as the state becomes more heavily involved in the economy. In turn, this weakens state institutions and prevents the use of rents to ensure long-term sustainable socio-economic development. Rentierism is now widely used in Nigeria to explain the majority of the country's development issues (Anichie and Soludo, 2010).

These scholars' main contention, which emphasizes how the capitalist class uses the state as an instrument to achieve its collective will, elucidates that Nigeria is merely a tool in the hands of the capitalist society to foster capitalist accumulation and profit, as opposed to the conventional literature that claims the state is a "neutral power broker" in relation to the interests of capital and labor (Abobie in Olusanya and Akindele, 1990:17-19). They claim that the Nigerian state, which was created at independence before oil was discovered, was designed primarily to serve the interests of the colonial capital elite. Additionally, they said that because the local capitalist class was still in its infancy at the time of independence, British capital, in particular, was the dominant capitalist interest that needed to be served. Therefore, it is clear that the early integration of British oil interests into Nigeria's oil industry was effected to advance those goals.

The next obvious move for the departing colonial administration was to set up the politics of the post-independence era in a way that promoted the protection of those same goals. This was skillfully accomplished through the adoption of the candidate selection process mechanism, which entails the recruitment of selected upper-class and middle-class peers into the country's political leadership. The ideological legitimization mechanism was let loose in order to maintain this bond and keep the comprador divided. The process involves the development, promotion, and upholding of specific ideals. These values include those that claim that a specific development component is the best accessible option. It also featured the propagation of the fallacy that the only entities with the resources, know-how, and expertise to extract oil were international oil corporations. The fallacy effectively prevented the Nigerian state from aspiring to take control of its oil business and gave rise to the secondary, no less harmful misconception that the oil industry is an "enclave" and, as such, has no value for economic progress. The Nigerian state eventually got content with its status of ownership without control as a result of this myth (Yates, 1996:19).

The ownership and control structure of the oil resources provides a straightforward explanation for this. Despite the fact that the Federal Government of Nigeria is the exclusive owner of all land (including sub-oil) within the country, only a few numbers of multinational corporations have been given complete control over the country's natural resources since the country's oil exploration began. Government rent is then paid by these businesses. Nigeria, a rentier state, is thereby automatically guilty due to the fact that these enterprises are foreign-owned and the "rents" that have been paid are characterized as coming from an outside source.

As a result, the elite are content with their material circumstances and "dedicate greater part of their resources to jealously guarding the status quo" rather than focusing on the goal of accelerating the fundamental socio-economic transition. Rentier elites tend to get complacent and lack disposition of "necessity being is the mother of invention" because they are shielded by the luxuries of their surroundings provided by external rents. According to Beblaw, the rentier's reward "becomes a windfall gain, an isolated fact" as a result of the breakdown in the work-reward linkage. Instead of being the consequence of a protracted process of systematic and organized production, income and riches are viewed as situational or incidental (Yates, 1996, p. 21).

To support this claim, it should be noted that in 1951 Iran nationalized its oil sector, which was then taken over by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum BP), and that Iranian oil was then subject to a global embargo. The United States' State Department proposed the formation of a "Consortium" of significant oil companies as a means of reintroducing Iranian oil output to world markets. Following this, the following companies came together to form the "Consortium for Iran": Anglo-Persian Oil Company (United Kingdom); Gulf Oil (United States); Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands/United Kingdom); Standard Oil of California ("Social"); Standard Oil of New Jersey (Essa) (United States); Standard Oil 'Co. of New York ("Socony"); and Texaco (United States). Enrico Mattei, an Italian legislator at the time, is credited for referring to this group as "the Seven Sisters" in a well-known manner (Wikipedia, accessed 10/10/10). The Iranian government was overthrown in 1953 as a result of a coup supported by the CIA (see Gasiorowski 1987, cited in Humphrys, Sachs, and Stieglitz 2007:14), which took place prior to the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Regarding Iran, this has always been true.

From the aforementioned vantage point, the low rents appear more as an asset than as a source of revenue. As a result, it was determined that the non-renewable nature of the resources and the separation of the oil sector from domestic political and economic processes give rise to a wide range of economic and political processes that have a negative impact on the economy. One of the greatest risks, in their opinion, is the emergence of what political scientists refer to as "rent-seeking behavior" (Humphreys, Sachs, and Stieglitz, 2007, P4).

Theoretical Framework

Marxian theory holds that the state is not a manifestation of superior reason, as idealists contend, nor is it a manifestation of superior will, as liberals maintain, but rather a tool of class power created to serve the interests of the ruling class at the expense of its rival class.

This goes on to say that the state was created by humans and is not a natural institution. It's a manifestation of how alienated people are. It is a tool that its designers are now at odds with. According to Robert Tucker, "mature Marxism still retains Marx's early image of the state as an alienated social power, a creature of society that eventually becomes opulent over its creator." Class conflict gave rise to the state. It is a tool of class domination, and force is it's foundation. In the words of Marx, "the state is a parasite, feeding upon and obstructing the free movement of society." This completely describes Nigeria's predicament in relation to rent-seeking, as further discussed.

Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Nigeria

Similar to other post-colonial countries, the Nigerian state that the colonial authority left behind lacked the legitimacy to assure the collaboration of the populace and the public service. This made rent seeking at all levels of government, including the highest levels, simple to justify. Every government that comes into power, whether through popular vote or armed force, tends to perceive its position as insecure. There are plausible explanations for this. Nigeria is a sizable nation with a population of around 210 million people, who are divided into a number of rival ethnic, tribal, and religious groupings. Few politicians have tried to create a national cross-group appeal since it has proven difficult to establish a durable majority coalition of factions. There have been several constitutional amendments in Nigeria throughout the years that have attempted to establish the prerequisites for a stable democracy, but none of them has succeeded (Herbst and Olukoshi 1994; Diamond, 1993; 1995). The people in charge have benefited directly from using state resources, as well as helped the organizations that support them. All post-colonial governments, both military and civilian, have exhibited patron-client ties (Herbst and Olukoshi 1994, p.455).

In Nigeria, clientalism, according to Herbst (1996, p. 157), is not just theft committed by people looking to "raider the coffers of the state," but is also justified by political norms that regard it as achieving the short-term goals of the victorious coalition. Even under the Second Republic, which ran from 1979 to 1983, the state, according to Richard Joseph (1996, p.195), "was a national cake to be divided and subdivided among officeholders." The very real lack of security of tenure that initially motivated such behavior is then exacerbated by high levels of rent seeking and clientalism. In a typical unstable spiral, a regime's impending demise motivates the rulers and their customers to extract rents at a faster rate, hastening the regime's demise.

Massive petroleum deposits in Nigeria have made the situation worse (Herbst 1996, Olowu 1993). The majority of Nigeria's government revenue and 90% of its exports are derived from oil (Herbst and Olukoshi, 1994). They also argue that the oil reserves are governed by the state and that those in charge and their political cronies benefit greatly from them. Nigeria gained greatly, particularly during the years of the oil crisis. Control of the government consequently emerged as a desirable goal worth pursuing. Instead of participating in successful entrepreneurship, those who wanted to become wealthy fought for a piece of the rents (Diamond 1993, p. 220; 1995, p. 474; Herbst 1996; Lewis 1996, p. 81). The stakes of politics are simply too great, as stated by Diamond (1993, p. 218).

The ultimate incidence of payoffs is a crucial consideration when attempting to comprehend the effects of corruption and rent-seeking in Nigeria. Do they just lessen the profits of international firms, or do they also cost the nation money? The costs appear to have been high, notwithstanding the absence of conclusive data. After ten years of an oil boom, the typical Nigerian's per capita income was unchanged from 1974 to 1984. According to data from the World Bank quoted by Herbst and Olukoshi (1994, p. 453), the economy shrank by 0.4 percent yearly during the 1980s, and Nigeria was the seventeenth poorest nation in the world in 1990 with a per capita income that was less than that of Kenya or India. In terms of human development, Nigeria was ranked 137th out of 174 nations in the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Report in 1996 (UNDP 1996, p. 137), and as of the year 2022, it is ranked 163rd out of 191 nations in the HDI (UNDP, 2022). While foreign direct investment is higher than in other emerging nations, it is largely focused in the oil sector (Jun 1996; Lewis 1996, p. 98). Indonesia, on the other hand, is actively luring foreign direct investment in a wide range of sectors despite having its own substantial petroleum reserves.

Despite the fact that we are unable to calculate the total cost of lost economic growth, the inefficiencies in some instances seem significant. It costs $2.4 billion to construct an aluminum smelter, which was widely believed to have no legitimate development purpose. Its price was reportedly 60–100% more expensive than comparable plants in other developing nations (Diamond, 1993, p. 217). Given this number, it is highly improbable that the overseas contractors were responsible for the corruption's costs and it emphasizes the size of the nation's loss. Despite having a $1.4 billion initial budget, a steel factory ultimately cost $4 billion (Herbst and Olukoshi, 1994). In the middle of the 1970s, government procurement officials accepted kickbacks in order to secure cement deliveries that were five times greater than what the nation required (New York Times, December 4, 1975). The port of Lagos was jam-packed with ships eager to discharge the surplus goods. A pipeline, a number of irrigation projects, an export terminal, and a petrochemical facility are all listed by Faraqee (1994, pp. 250-251) as being unfeasible or unduly expensive.

According to Herbst and Olukoshi (1994, p. 465), the previous import licensing system was a significant source of bribes and patronage during the Buhari regime in the early 1980s, which may be why the IMF supported free trade reforms. These licenses' high value is a sign that the system's upkeep expenses are being passed on to regular consumers in the form of higher pricing. The successor regime did take action against certain particular corrupt public officials and private business owners, but the fundamental causes of rent seeking were not addressed due to the absence of any reform in the basic, highly controlled structure (Herbst and Olukoshi, 1994, pp. 469–470). The import licensing system was able to be abolished by the late 1980s because it had fallen into such disrepute. It appears that the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, whose members had previously paid bribes without protest, started to realize that they would no longer be constrained if the system were eliminated. The elimination of the import licensing system was also accompanied by the introduction of new rent-seeking opportunities (Faraqee 1994, p. 246; Herbst and Olukoshi 1994, pp. 481-482).

Through government contracts and onerous regulations, the changes brought about by structural adjustment limited the rents that were offered. But new chances appeared in sectors like financial services, access to foreign cash, and privatization (Ihonvbere 1993; Lewis 1996; pp. 89–90). Furthermore, people from all walks of life and from different political and economic perspectives made good money by smuggling gasoline across domestic and international borders with the help of deceiving governmental officials. Because the official domestic price was far lower than the market prices in the surrounding nations and on the global market, this encouraged the diversion of supply from the home market. Although such activity might be regarded as improving efficiency, it constituted a very expensive way to clear the market because it needed to be done covertly

Therefore, common people were not unaware of the theft of public cash into individual accounts. Several governments were overthrown as a result of the scandals that followed, but the new leaders frequently failed to even attempt to curtail corruption within their own ranks (Faraqee 1994, 244–247). Instead, the advantages of power were shared by the new set of rulers and their friends. Although Nigeria has anti-corruption legislation, they haven't had much of an impact (Diamond 1993, pp. 221-222). The history of Nigeria shows how profound social differences, which are represented in strong patron-client ties, can result in a pathological state that feeds and builds on itself like a vicious cycle.

The Nigerian example indicates that, contrary to what our model predicts, a country's rulers may not be as strong when corruption is widespread. The sole autonomous actor in our model is the ruler. The institutions of society impose restrictions on the political leadership, but they do not have a strategic relationship with significant players in the rest of society. This condition doesn't seem to hold in Nigeria. Nigeria has had its share of corrupt leaders, but history suggests that this is not enough to bring about significant transformation (Herbst 1996). A significant barrier to effective government action is the presence of strong private actors and organizations. Sharp wealth-sharing traditions that are ingrained in society defy change.

Conclusion

Nigeria is without a doubt a rentier state; oil income, which accounts for over 95% of her total revenues (Anyaogu 2022), is mostly distributed among a small but privileged class, and no significant steps have been taken to diversify her economy for productivity. The Nigerian economy is rentier, which has provided an ideal environment for corruption and flagrant abuse of public resources. While certain groups sit and collect rent in the form of subsidies and tax vacations, the vast majority of Nigerians continue to live in extreme poverty. Other activities include contract inflation, full divergence and appropriation of the generosity from international capital's planning to establish monopoly in the nation's main markets, as well as inflation of other contracts.

Recommendations

The following suggestions are presented in light of our analytical discourse:

The Nigerian political elite's disposition has to move away from an unproductive aloofness than permits crude rent seeking than progressive production of goods and services for the Nigerian populace. In doing this significant policy changes should be made to strengthen key institutions to improve checks and balances in favor of a political economy than extols efficient productioner than authoritarian rent seeking.

Secondly, the political leadership should emphasize the culture of research and development (R&D) to aid technology assimilation and transfer. Import substitution should be properly regulated and executed to lessen reliance on import-based industrialization and technology. Therefore government sponsored reform initiatives that support R&D in the public interest should be articulated and implemented.

The Nigerian state needs to evolve a strong Civil Society, Media and Political party synergy and engagement is necessary to inspire a collective progressive political will for Nigeria's economic diversification and to foster a culture of productivity. This should be based on the ideology that sees and upholds economic production and denounces raw rent seeking which has constantly diminished governance in Nigeria.

Finally to empower the right type of progressive leadership, the leadership recruitment criteria should be reformed so that persons with defective personalities that seek primitive accumulation rather than sophisticated production are excluded from attaining strategic leadership positions so that trustworthy and patriotic governments emerge

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